Europe seeks to play the role of neutral mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet for a host of reasons – most of them self-serving – Europe has demonstrated a clear pro-Arab bias, including insensitivity to Israel’s security needs. And it excuses Arab terrorism that no civilized nation would ever tolerate if faced with similar attacks.

Ironically, much of the instability in the Middle East stems from the way Europe handled the region as colonial powers. Unlike nation-states in Europe, modern Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi nationalities did not evolve. They were arbitrarily created by colonial powers.

In 1919, in the wake of World War I, England and France carved up the former Ottoman Empire into geographic spheres of influence, dividing the Mideast into new political entities with new names and frontiers. Some of the newly created states’ names came from classical antiquity, such as Syria and Palestine, while others were based on geographic designations, such as Jordan and Lebanon.

Territory was divided along map meridians without regard for traditional frontiers (i.e., geographic logic and sustainability) or the ethnic composition of indigenous populations. The prevailing rationale behind these artificially created states was how they served the imperial and commercial needs of their colonial masters. Iraq and Jordan, for instance, were created as emirates to reward the noble Hashemite family from Saudi Arabia for its loyalty to the British against the Ottoman Turks during World War I, under the leadership of Lawrence of Arabia. Iraq was given to Faisal in 1918. To reward his younger brother Abdullah with an emirate, in 1922 Britain cut away 77 percent of their mandate over Palestine earmarked for the Jews and gave it to him, creating the new country of Transjordan or Jordan, as it later was named.

The European nation-state model was ill suited to the structure of social organization indigenous to the Middle East where clans, tribes, ethnic groups, Islamic sects, and regional loyalties dominate social units. Much of the conflict in Arab states today reflects that reality, while anti-Zionism has become the glue that holds them together.

The manner in which European colonial powers carved out political entities with little regard to their ethnic composition not only leads to inter-ethnic violence,
but also encouraged dictatorial rule as the only force capable of holding such entities together, according to Hebrew University Professor Shlomo Avineri. That phenomenon also poses a stumbling block that to this day makes democratization a difficult objective to achieve.

Against this backdrop, members of the EU want another chance to remold the Middle East, including a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which the British were unable to resolve during 30 years of British Mandate rule. Even during that period, Great Britain’s track record was poor, conjuring up a series of so-called peace plans that attempted to appease the Arabs so that they would accept the Jews. Today, the EU aims to solve the conflict at Israel’s expense for a host of self-serving reasons.

Europe’s claim that it can be an even-handed mediator does not hold water. Besides a poor record in solving problems as colonial powers, member states of the EU would make poor facilitators in the Middle East for several reasons, including their dependence on Arab trade and Arab oil.

As an alliance of 27 western European nations, the EU has staked out a position as one of the four players of the so-called Quartet, which seeks “to promote a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict.” The other Quartet members include the United States, Russia, and the United Nations, the last largely controlled by the Third World.

Europeans and Jews share a host of cultural values and economic bonds, but the relationship is anomalous in that it includes a strong economic partnership and a weak political partnership.

Centuries of European antisemitism culminated in the Holocaust, made possible not only by the rise of Nazism in Germany, but by the acts of other European countries as well – acts of commission and omission. Two years after World War II, European nations supported the UN plan calling for a Jewish state, support that reflected both a sense of guilt toward the Jews, and national interests. Although every Arab state rejected Israel’s right to exist, Western Europe forged diplomatic and economic relations with Israel. Britain and France even established strategic relations with Israel in the early 1950s when Britain sought to regain control over the Suez Canal from Egypt.

Europe and Israel share a host of enlightened values. Putting aside the role of Jews in Western culture, the EU and Israel logically ought to be natural partners, since Israel has developed into a vibrant, open free democracy much like the nations of western Europe.

Israel values and upholds freedom of the press and religion, and maintains a judicial system based on the rule of law just as EU member states do. Israel is also committed to human rights, including the rights of women, gays and lesbians, and minorities. For instance, if one examines infant mortality levels, a universally accepted yardstick of commitment to human rights used by the United Nations, Israel has a lower infant mortality rate among its Arab minority than minorities in France, Britain and other European countries. Its social
philosophy and health and welfare system are also similar to Europe’s, and its standard of living is on a European level. Culturally, Israel’s admiration and appreciation of classical European culture is almost unprecedented. Israeli theatergoers exceed the number of fans who attend sporting events. The number of orchestras and other ensembles, combined with the number of classical music patrons, is also high.

Europe is Israel’s largest trade partner, and Israel has been a member of the European Economic Union since 1975.\(^8\) Israel is also the UK’s second-largest trade partner in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia. In 1995 the British did more trade with five million Israelis than with the combined economic power of 95 million Arabs in the nations of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.\(^9\) Israel’s scientific, technological, and research capabilities also drive trade relations, which is why the EU in 1995 made Israel the first non-European member of its Fourth Framework R&D program.

Given the shared values and economic, technological and cultural ties, the question arises why Europeans and Israelis are not more closely allied politically. An Anti-Defamation League study described the relationship as “an anomalous strategic relationship,”\(^10\) citing a number of underlying reasons based on historic ties, political economics and realpolitik or “politics based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives.” Whatever the reasons for the cleavage between economics and politics, none support the EU’s claim that it can be an honest broker in the Middle East.

After Abdul Nasser took over Egypt in 1953, Great Britain, France and Israel all perceived the pan-Arabism that Nasser championed as a threat. The three, each for its own reason, joined forces in the 1956 Sinai Campaign – the Europeans to ensure free access to the Suez Canal, and Israel to ensure its security from the growing threat posed by Egypt, which had become a base for infiltrators and a client state for mass quantities of East European arms.

For a period of time, France and Israel even developed an extraordinarily close relationship in the 1950s and early 1960s, against the backdrop of France’s war in Algeria, when some of the strategic interests of the two countries merged. And in the 1950s, German reparations also helped build the State of Israel. Yet, historically and practically, Europe has had too many interests in Arab countries for Israel to compete for long when European foreign policy is based exclusively on a highly cynical form of realpolitik that is endemic to Europe’s political culture.

A Jerusalem Post editorial published in April 2003\(^11\) reflects the Israeli sense of distrust of Europeans, crystallized by Europe’s realpolitik: “The basis for mistrust is not Europe’s wartime history,” wrote the Post. “What we can’t forget is what has happened since, at times when the chips were down and Israel’s very survival was at stake.” The paper cited the embargo France imposed on Israel on the verge of the outbreak of the Six-Day War that stopped the supply of spare parts for equipment France had previously sold to Israel. And again, Europe demonstrated just how untrustworthy it was when all nations except Portugal
refused to allow U.S. cargo planes to fly over their countries to rush emergency supplies to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The Jerusalem Post also criticized Europe’s unbridled support for the Palestinians, while ignoring their terror campaign. Perhaps the culmination was in 2002 when French president Jacques Chirac invited the head of Hezbollah to a summit of French-speaking nations as an honored guest. Moreover, Israelis cannot forgive the indifference most Europeans have demonstrated toward Israeli casualties, as respected European intellectuals justify suicide bombings as testimony to Israeli oppression and guilt.

Europe’s support for the Arabs today, based on the mistaken assumption one can buy immunity from Arab terror and ensure the flow of oil, is about as viable as Europe’s sell-out of Czechoslovakia in 1938 for “peace in our times.” In the meantime, by not setting limits, Europe’s shortsighted policy encourages extremism. Continued support of the Palestinians, despite the terrorism, prolongs violence and loss of Israeli and Palestinian lives.

The bond between Europe and the Arab world has its origins in the age of empire building and colonialism when Europeans ruled the Middle East, a strategic area both in terms of oil and access to their colonies in the Far East. After conquering the Middle East in World War I, Europeans essentially ran the region directly or through friendly proxy governments for nearly the first half of the twentieth century. As the Daily Telegraph points out: “In dismantling the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century … [the British] made a reciprocal commitment: If the Arabs would become British allies against the Turks, they would promote the revival of the Arab world in return.” And so Arabists began to play a core role in the British foreign office, among policy-makers, civil servants, bureaucrats and diplomats, and this pro-Arab bent continues to this day. France and England created new, though unstable, polities as they had promised — all neighbors of modern-day Israel. Yet as the Daily Telegraph notes, “The emotional commitment [to the Arab world] exists to this day. One encounters officials in the government and civil service who seem right out of a Lawrence of Arabia syndrome.”

Access to Middle Eastern oil has been a major factor in Europe’s relationship with the Arab and Muslim world since the discovery of oil in Iraq in the 1920s. In part, that is because Europe is much more dependent on Arab oil than the United
States. As a result, the industrialized European Union is a major consumer of Middle East oil, and its dependence on that oil is increasing, as Europe imports nearly half of its oil from the Middle East. Renewable energy constitutes only 6 percent of the EU’s total energy supply, according to the Guardian, and its dependence on oil imports as a whole will rise to 90 percent by 2030. Against that backdrop, it is easy to see why Europe views Israel as the fly in the ointment in terms of securing a vital asset – perhaps the real fuel behind the disparaging remark of the French ambassador to London, at a social event, labeling Israel “that shitty little country.”

The Middle East is also a lucrative market for European products, including industrial goods, and the EU receives significant Middle East investment capital as well. Because the Middle East accounts for more than 40 percent of the world arms market, the EU continues to sell arms to the region, as does the United States. Yet Europe’s behavior toward Israel hardly engenders trust. Prior to the 2003 war in Iraq, for example, Britain imposed an unofficial embargo on key spare parts and equipment to Israel, including one-of-a-kind British-made catapult pellets for pilot ejection seats. An even more blatant example occurred in 1979: After the UK expressed its commitment to Israel’s security, it allowed the British government-owned-and-operated international oil company, British Petroleum, to refuse to sell Israel British crude oil after Israel lost oil deliveries from Iran and Sinai. Other EU countries, including Germany and Belgium, have also imposed embargoes against Israel.

EU states, particularly the southern European nations of France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal, worry constantly that political unrest or economic instability in the Middle East and North Africa could lead to uncontrollable migration across the Mediterranean into Europe. Muslims today number 53 million in Europe, including about 6 million in France (or 10 percent of France’s overall population) and nearly 2 million in the UK. France’s large Muslim population thus constitutes an electorate that must be reckoned with, compared to the estimated 700,000 French Jews.

Birth rates also play a role in Europe’s position toward the Muslim world. While high birth rates among Muslim immigrants in Europe are gradually changing European demographics, native Europeans birth rates are at zero population growth or even lower. Coupled with a further influx of Muslim refugees and illegal immigration, the homogeneity of European nation-states and the fragile ethnic balance in countries such as Belgium is being challenged. Added to that mix is the growing activism of second-generation, university-educated Muslims in Europe who have become involved in Islamic causes and are setting the tone for anti-Zionist protests, which Europe’s radical Left also supports. In Antwerp, for instance, 30,000 persons of Arab origin live in a city of 450,000. The Arab European League, a marginal emigrant organization, not only organizes pro-Palestinian protests; it has called for creation of an Islamic political party and seeks to make Arabic the fourth official language of Belgium after French, Flemish, and German.
Such trends can be expected to grow, as Europe’s non-Muslim population remains flat or declines through 2015, according to the European Community’s 2002 Social Situation Report. At the same time, the “Middle East populations will be significantly larger, poorer, more urban and more disillusioned,” by 2015, warns a CIA global report. All of that means the EU will continue to depend on Arab labor, according to Professor Kenneth Stein of Emory University, and that phenomenon must ultimately impact on European policy.

So what happens when European labor demand meets Arab supply over the next two decades and beyond?

“Externally, mass immigration will influence common or separate policies towards immigration, asylum, exiles and foreign policy choices with respect to Israel.”

On July 28, 2004 Princeton historian Bernard Lewis told the conservative Hamburg-based daily Die Welt that:

“Europe would be Islamic by the end of this century ‘at the very latest,’ ... Asked whether the EU could serve as a global counterweight to the United States, Lewis replied simply: ‘No.’ He saw three potential ‘global’ players: China, India, and possibly a revivified Russia. ‘Europe,’ he said, ‘will be part of the Arabic west, of the Maghreb.’ He did not assert this as a risqué or contrarian proposition. He just said it, as if it were something that every politically neutral and intellectually honest person takes for granted.”

Looking for world balance of power, Europe aspires to superpower status. This is ‘understandable,’ but Israel impedes this strategy by its ‘dissonance’ with its Arab neighbors. European aspirations threaten America’s freedom to protect its own vital interests.

The United States has come to the aid of Europe three times in the 20th century – in World War I when it saved France by breaking the horror of trench warfare; in World War II when it liberated Europe from Nazi domination; and in the Cold War when it contained Soviet expansion. Yet, as former Israeli foreign minister Moshe Arens recalled, “Gratitude does not seem to be a component of European foreign policy,” as their ingratitude was only surpassed by their colossal hypocrisy.

Since 1995, the EU has been building the foundation to expand eastward by creating a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which would create a new relationship between the two sides of the Mediterranean-based common interests. By 2010, a security alliance and a free trade zone is envisioned, which for example, will enable Europe to reach parity with the economic power of the U.S. economy and challenge the U.S. politically by presenting a united front. The concept, founded at the Barcelona Conference in 1995, views the Mediterranean as a single region from an economic and security standpoint. It aspires to link 27 countries in one bloc – 15 members of the EU with 15 Mediterranean partners. The latter includes Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and the PA. Peace and stability in the Mediterranean region are considered prerequisites for economic and social development, which is why the partners are trying to hammer out
agreement on a joint “Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean Region.”

Is the EU’s plan designed to challenge American hegemony internationally, as Shlomo Perla, a scholar of international relations at Bar-Ilan University, suggests? “[The EU’s] policy is a symptom of a world system in the making in the post-Cold War era,” writes Perla. The aims of a French-led EU policy are “augmenting its power and international posture to such a degree that would lend it a super power status capable of performing in the global arena parallel to and independently of the United States.”

Indicative of that trend, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, is the decline in voting coincidences at the United Nations between the United States and EU member states (all so-called friends and allies). Impeding the EU’s aspirations is the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Europeans want a solution, even if it is gained at Israel’s expense. Moreover, a European solution would enhance the continent’s status while at the same time challenging American hegemony.

Thus, although the United States and Israel maintain a strategy that refuses to reward Palestinians with political gains if they continue to espouse terrorism, the EU in February 2002 adopted a French plan that called for the immediate creation of a Palestinian state and its immediate recognition by Israel as the starting point for peace talks.

Such cynical application of power politics by the EU for narrow short-term gains demonstrates a lack of responsible global leadership and the absence of balance vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it should invalidate the EU from serving as honest broker or facilitator when talks resume. Such behavior is based almost solely on ulterior motives that have little to do with peacemaking. The conflict and Europe’s role as a member of the Quartet are unfortunately no more than instruments that allow the EU to exploit a key role in the Arab-Israeli conflict – no matter how or at whose expense – as a demonstration of Europe’s arrival as a major power broker.

The EU’s desire to court favor with the Arab world has led its members to support radical anti-Israel resolutions in the UN and adopt a series of pro-Palestinian declarations that ignore Israel’s needs, including Israel’s human rights.

Europeans share a host of common policy positions with Arab leaders on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The most obvious is an insistence on a fully independent Palestinian Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza, a position the EU made official in its 1999 Berlin Declaration in exchange for the Palestinians’ agreement not to unilaterally declare statehood without making peace with Israel.

The EU has supported numerous anti-Israeli resolutions adopted by the United Nations. Particularly jarring are the ones taken in the UN Human Rights Commission, a UN body with a history of biased votes against Israel. Among
those that passed in 1999 with the help of European votes was a call for Palestinian self-determination based on Resolution 181 (the UN Partition Plan of 1947). If implemented, the Jewish state would be cut to half of what it was prior to the Six-Day War; if implemented, Israel would be forced to allow all Arab refugees from 1948 – estimated today at some 4 million persons – the right to return and settle in Israel proper. Both parts of the resolution would effectively spell the end of Israel – one geography, the other demography. Another striking anti-Israel vote came on April 15, 2002, in the midst of a wave of suicide bombings: Six of nine EU members on the UN’s Human Rights Commission – Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden – voted in favor of another resolution that condemned Israel and affirmed “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to resist Israeli occupation,” which effectively gave terrorism a green light. Italy abstained. Only Germany and the UK opposed the motion. The U.S. issued an official protest to the Human Rights Commission, branding the resolution “more unbalanced and inflammatory than in the past,” adding that the vote “casts the Commission in the position of supporting the use of terrorism and violence against Israeli civilians rather than promoting protection of human rights,” and noting “the right of any country, including Israel, to act in its own self-defence – to protect its own citizens from attack.”

Exactly one year later, the same commission adopted a resolution sanctioning the Palestinians’ use of “all available means, including armed struggle,” a designation that implied that suicide bombings are a legitimate tactic against Israelis. Only five countries, including the United States, voted against it. The UK and France abstained. Russia approved the motion.

Both the 2002 and 2003 votes followed the 2001 Durban-I Conference on Racism, which European governments and Europe-based NGOs, including Amnesty International, attended, even though the conference turned into an Israel-bashing feast. The United States and Israel walked out, but the fact that the European participants continued to participate gave the conference an aura of legitimacy and credibility.

Another watershed event was the anti-Israel Resolution ES-10 passed by the General Assembly in July 2004, in ‘response’ to the biased anti-Israel advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that month regarding the ‘illegality’ of Israel’s security fence. Most European countries opposed the request for an advisory opinion as ‘not the appropriate forum’ and most abstained in passage of the GA request. The EU was aware that the ruling was designed to bash Israel, but in the process would politicize the Court and undermine its prestige. Nevertheless, after the ruling, the EU blindly accepted the ‘findings’ of the openly-biased proceeding that was rift with selective and even fallacious use of documents to reach a foregone conclusion, as if the ruling was Scriptures. In ES-10, the EU voted for a resolution that ‘grants’ Palestinians title to disputed territories [i.e. usage of the designation “Occupied Palestinian Territory” (including East Jerusalem)] whose future is supposed to be the foundation for comprehensive peace (the “peace for territories” principle), undermining the
peace process. The EU turned a blind eye to the fact that the resolution pretends the GA and the ICJ have obligatory powers that do not exist in the UN Charter:

The resolution claims “Israel is under obligation to ... cease forthwith ... construction of the Wall ... dismantle [it] ... and make reparation for all damage caused to Palestinians” and “demands that Israel ... comply ... [and] demands that all Member States comply with its legal obligations as identified in the advisory opinion.” Neither the ICJ ruling nor the GA resolution even so much as mention the ‘terrorism,’ which is considered irrelevant to the security fence issue by the GA and the Court – another expression of European indifference to Israeli suffering. If this was not enough, European UN ambassadors and senior officials in the European Union took an unprecedented step: They worked hand-in-hand with the PLO observer to the UN, Nasser al-Kidwa to make minor amendments in the original draft presented by the Arab League and penned by the PLO, so that the EU could vote for it. In the aftermath, a senior EU delegate claimed “we succeeded in balancing the wording of the resolution.” U.S. ambassador to the UN John Danforth branded the resolution “utterly one-sided since it refrains from mentioning the threat of terror hovering over Israel.” The European Union considered abstaining, but then simply capitulated to appease the Arab bloc, voting en bloc – all 27 EU states in favor of the resolution, by their reckless actions giving the resolution an aura of respectability and legitimacy. The unanimous vote (rather than a split vote) was the upshot of pressure on member states from Dutch foreign minister Bernard Bot – the president of the EU.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana hailed passage of the ‘fence resolution’ as a victory of EU policy, declaring that “in our vote, we presented joint superior values and policy lines which we intend to promote internationally,” further clarifying that “the fact that no European state abstained from the vote derives from the fact that the EU is a political union.” Such conduct and concepts of “balance,” “superior values,” and enlightened “policy” disqualify the EU from any claims that it can serve as an honest broker in direct negotiations between Arabs and Jews, or be a constructive facilitator in any other capacity in the peace process. The United States and Australia, it should be noted, voted against the resolution and Canada abstained.

Yet the EU’s pro-Arab bias is not confined to UN votes. The European Council, the central policy body of the EU, often employs language that mirrors positions held by Palestinian Arab leaders.

When Israel imposed closures, blockades, and curfews to protect its citizens from terrorists (who move explosives and operatives by mixing with civilian traffic – even posing as people in need of emergency medical care), the EU accused Israel of punishing the innocent. When Israel pursued a policy of targeted killings against the leaders of terrorist cells who were orchestrating terrorist attacks or making bombs, the EU branded those pinpoint actions “extra-judicial killings,” arguing that they “do not bring security to the Israeli population.” Ironically, those very counterterrorism tactics they repudiate are employed by American and British forces in Iraq. In short, Europe’s response to every tactic Israel
employs to counter terrorism whether passive or proactive – is viewed as illegitimate or detrimental.

Even isolating Arafat in his Ramallah compound for a month in April 2002 (while providing him and his entourage with ample food supplies) was met by a steady stream of European well-wishers. A year later, while on a state visit to Israel, German Foreign Minister Joschke Fischer said there were some 30 European diplomats who wished to meet with Arafat, including the EU’s Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. Those meetings could only undermine American and Israeli efforts at the time to pressure Arafat to turn the reins of power over to a successor.

European expressions of condolence also are carefully balanced, creating moral equivalency between victims and victimizers. Consider the following sequence of events:

- On March 6, 2003, an EU representative laid wreaths in Haifa where a suicide bomber had killed 15 Israelis and wounded 30 the day before. The next day the EU ‘responded to events in Haifa and Gaza,’ referring to the Haifa bus attack and an Israeli incursion into Gaza to ferret out terrorists, balancing the two events and declaring, “terrorism and violence must end.”

- On March 21, 2003, the EU called for “immediate publication and implementation of the road map.”

- On March 31, 2003, following another suicide bomber attack, this time in Netanya, the EU evenhandedly “condemned all use of violence.”

- Israel responded in a three-day (April 2-4) incursion into Tul Karm to root out terrorists; it included rounding up and systematically questioning 2,000 men, 11 of whom were taken into custody for interrogation. In the course of the incursion, the Tul Karm head of Islamic Jihad was apprehended and the bomb factory he operated destroyed. At the time, he was preparing a car bomb for detonation in Tel Aviv over Passover. On March 7, the EU responded to the Israeli action by “condemning the use of ‘collective punishment’ in Tul Karm.”

Human Rights Watch, an independent NGO which is hardly pro-Israel, investigated the phenomenon of suicide bombing. It charged that the systematic and intentional nature of those attacks as well as their scope constituted “crimes against humanity.” Despite that independent finding, the EU has yet to condemn such Arab terrorism in a strong, singular, unequivocal, unconditional voice.

In fact, just the opposite has occurred: Rather than condemn Palestinian Arab terrorist tactics, the European Council’s December 2002 Declaration on the Middle East condemned Israel’s “excessive use of force” when it retaliates against the terror attacks. But the charge seemed hollow in light of the way the British dealt with Palestinian Arab violence under the British Mandate; during the Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939, they killed 5,032 Palestinians, wounded 14,760, detained 50,000, hanged 146, and sentenced to life prison terms 2,000, according to Oxford historian Professor Glen Rangwala. In addition, during that three-year counterinsurgency campaign 5,000 houses were demolished in reprisals, and
40,000 Arab residents of Palestine, mostly wealthy families, fled to neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{54} During the eight-year Algerian Civil War, France escalated its troop levels in Algeria from 50,000 personnel in 1954 to 400,000 in 1962. One million Algerians died in the course of the war.

The EU’s behavior makes it ineligible as a neutral facilitator in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It should not be allowed to pressure Israel on life-and-death security issues, nor to decide Israel’s destiny.
/0679642811/ref=lib_rd_ss/102-9059379-9984151?v=glance&s=books&vi=slide-show - reader-link.
2 For a discussion of this characteristic, which has stymied attempts to create genuine nationhood and transformed anti-Zionism into a device – as a unifying factor around which Arab nationalism could be crystallized – see Avi Shlaim’s review of Adeed Dawisha’s Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: “From Triumph to Despair,” Guardian, March 29, 2003 at:
http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/books/story/0,10595,924043,00.html.
3 This insight was raised in a July 11, 2003 op-ed piece in the Hebrew daily Yediot Aharonot.
4 Statement of the Middle East Quartet, July 16, 2002, European Union press release, see:
5 Voting for the UN plan were Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
6 One should not forget Israel’s debt to the Soviet bloc and the Czech arms that enabled Israel to survive the War of Independence when the West, including the United States, instituted an arms embargo.
10 For the full study, see “Europe and Israel: Where Politics and Economics Do Not Mix,” ADL, August 1998, at: www.adl.org/international/EU-print.asp.
12 “Chirac Honors Nasrallah, Preaches Human Rights,” Debka File, October 21, 2002 at:
13 Discovery of small amounts of ricin in London and Paris indicates no Western country is immune. See Jane’s report “Hunting for Bioterrorists,” Intelligence Digest, April 24, 2003 at:
15 Sinisa Stankovic, “Energy at the Crossroads,” October 30, 2001, at:
www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,584099,00.html.
16 “‘Anti-Semitic’ French Envoy under Fire,” BBC, December 20, 2001, at:
18 “Israel: Relations with Western Europe,” 1UpInfo.com at: www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-
study/israel/israel134.html. The loss was due to the fall of the Shah in 1978 and Khomeini’s takeover of Iran;
and Israel turned its only independent source of oil – oil fields discovered in Sinai – over to Egypt as part of
the 1978 peace treaty between the two countries. The refusal of the British to sell oil to Israel was verified by Ehud Yichieli, General Manager, Israel Fuel Authority, in a May 5, 2003 response to a letter of inquiry from the author.


25 Professor Kenneth W. Stein, “Consequences of Mass Arab Immigration to Europe,” Emory University Middle East Research Program, July 24, 2002 at: www.js.emory.edu/stein/Articles/nlcj80802.html.

26 See “When Bernard Lewis Speaks” at: www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/685ozxcq.asp?pg=2


28 For an overview, see “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” at the Website of the European Commission’s Delegation to Israel at: www.eu-del.org.il/english/content/eu_and_country/2.asp.


33 The EU’s commitment to support a Palestinian Arab state was part of a series of measures intended to compensate the Palestinian Authority in return for delaying its threat to unilaterally declare statehood; see Gerald Steinberg, “The European Union and the Middle East Peace Process,” JCPA (November 1999) at: www.jcpa.org/jl/vp418.htm.


38 For the text of the resolution opinion see: http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/c39066ba1f03c71385256edd00680366?OpenDocument.


41 GA resolutions and the Court’s advisory decision are non-binding recommendations that have no obligatory dimension whatsoever. Nor does the GA have the power to ‘demand’ anything, its powers being limited to debate and recommendations to the Security Council. Only the Security Council has ‘obligatory powers’ (Under Article VII) and can ‘demand’ compliance to certain directives it issues, but has never obliged Israel to do any of the above.


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 This includes 10 Eastern and Central European countries that joined the EU in May 2004.


49 Ferry Biedermann, “Coming to Terms with the ‘great equalizers,’” Asia Times, April 3, 2003 at: http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ED03Ak07.html.

50 For a list of Arafat’s ample ‘grocery list’ that included 13,200 pita breads and one box of corn flakes, see “Arafat Well Fed During Siege,” Jerusalem Post, April 30, 2002 at: www.jewishsf.com/bk020503/imideast.shtml.

52 Content is based on breaking news reports from the archives of the Hebrew daily Yediot Aharonot’s Website at: www.ynet.co.il/.

53 For the full Human Rights Watch report, see Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians, October 2002 at: www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/.

54 Dr. Glen Rangwala, Cambridge University, Chronology of Events in the Middle East from 1908 to 1966 at: http://middleeastreference.org.uk/Chronology.html.