4. Resolution 181 – the “Partition Plan”
Recommended “Partition Plan,” November 29, 1947
The International Court of Justice insists that as a UN institution it must take the case of the security fence, based on two major documents: The “Mandate for Palestine” and the November 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 1811 [the “Partition Plan”], a non-binding recommendation that was never legally consummated and one that all Arabs rejected by use of force.2
Had the recommendations of UN Resolution 181 been accepted and implemented by both parties, it would have been the foundation for the creation in Palestine of an Arab state and a Jewish state, and as a result would have terminated the Mandate for Palestine.
The Court’s careless ‘legal review’ of the status of the Territories reaches its apex in the way the ICJ relates to Resolution 181. The Court ignores Arab total rejectionism of the “Partition Plan” and views the recommendation of Resolution 181 as if it was a valid Security Council directive.
The ICJ cites Resolution 181 as one of the legal pillars supporting the right of Palestinian Arabs to self-determination alongside the “Mandate for Palestine.”
It appears that the ICJ was unaware of the fact that in November 1947, all Arab states voted as a bloc against Resolution 181 and kept their promise to defy its implementation by force.
Aware of Arab past aggression, Resolution 181, in paragraph C, calls on the Security Council to:
“… determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution” [italics by author].
The ones who sought to alter by force the settlement envisioned in Resolution 181 were the Arabs who threatened bloodshed if the UN were to adopt the Resolution:
“The Government of Palestine [E.H., that is, the British mandate government] fear that strife in Palestine will be greatly intensified when the Mandate is terminated, and that the international status of the United Nations Commission will mean little or nothing to the Arabs in Palestine, to whom the killing of Jews now transcends all other considerations. Thus, the Commission will be faced with the problem of how to avert certain bloodshed on a very much wider scale than prevails at present. … The Arabs have made it quite clear and have told the Palestine government that they do not propose to co-operate or to assist the Commission, and that, far from it, they propose to attack and impede its work in every possible way. We have no reason to suppose that they do not mean what they say”3 [italics by author].
Arab intentions and deeds did not fare better after Resolution 181 was adopted:
“Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine.”4
Resolution 181 reads:
“Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine … and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and … Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below …” [italics by author].
The ICJ in its preamble states:
“Recalling relevant General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, which partitioned mandated Palestine into two States, one Arab and one Jewish, …”
In fact, Resolution 181 was a non-binding resolution that only recommended partition. It never “partitioned” or “mandated” anything as the ICJ tries to inject.
The ICJ continues the discussion on the “Partition Plan” in paragraph 71 of the opinion:
“In 1947 the United Kingdom announced its intention to complete evacuation of the mandated territory by 1 August 1948, subsequently advancing that date to 15 May 1948. In the meantime, the General Assembly had on 29 November 1947 adopted resolution 181 (II) on the future government of Palestine, which ‘Recommends to the United Kingdom … and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation … of the Plan of Partition’ of the territory, as set forth in the resolution, between two independent States, one Arab, the other Jewish, as well as the creation of a special international régime for the City of Jerusalem. The Arab population of Palestine and the Arab States rejected this plan, contending that it was unbalanced; on 14 May 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence on the strength of the General Assembly resolution; armed conflict then broke out between Israel and a number of Arab States and the Plan of Partition was not implemented.”
The 1947 “Partition Plan” was the last of a series of recommendations that had been drawn up over the years by the Mandator and by international commissions, plans designed to reach an historic compromise between Arabs and Jews in western Palestine. The first was in 1922 when Great Britain obtained the League of Nations’ approval under Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine to cut away the territory east of the Jordan River – Trans-Jordan, today’s Jordan, for the benefit of the Arabs of Palestine. But this did not satisfy the Arabs who wanted the entire country.
Every scheme since 1922 has been rejected by the Arab side, including decidedly pro-Arab recommendations. This was not because the suggestions were “unbalanced,” as the ICJ has been told in Arab affidavits and as stated in paragraph 71 of the Court opinion, but because these plans recognized the Jews as a nation and gave the Jewish citizens of Mandate Palestine political dominance.
The ICJ’s use of the term “unbalanced” in describing the reason for Arab rejectionism of Resolution 181 hardly fits reality. 77 percent of the landmass of the original Mandate for the Jews was excised in 1922 to create a fourth Arab state: Trans-Jordan.
In the discussions leading to the formulation of the “Partition Plan,” the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine addressed the injustice of the plan to the Jewish people:
“According to David Lloyd George, then Prime Minister, the Balfour Declaration implied that the whole of Palestine, including Transjordan, should ultimately become a Jewish state. Transjordan had, nevertheless, been severed from Palestine in 1922 and had subsequently been set up as an Arab kingdom. Now a second Arab state was to be carved out of the remainder of Palestine, with the result that the Jewish National Home would represent less than one eighth of the territory originally set aside for it. Such a sacrifice should not be asked of the Jewish people.5
“Referring to the Arab states established as independent countries since the First World War, he said that 17,000,000 Arabs now occupied an area of 1,290,000 square miles, including all the principal Arab and Moslem centres, while Palestine, after the loss of Transjordan, was only 10,000 square miles; yet the majority plan proposed to reduce it by one half. UNSCOP proposed to eliminate Western Galilee from the Jewish State; that was an injustice and a grievous handicap to the development of the Jewish State.”6
The ICJ assumes that Israel’s independence is a result of a partial implementation of the “Partition Plan.”
The ICJ Bench states in paragraph 71 of its opinion that:
“… on 14 May 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence on the strength of the General Assembly resolution.”
Resolution 181 recognized the Jewish right to statehood, but its validity as a potentially legal and binding document was never consummated. Like the schemes that preceded it, Resolution 181’s validity hinged on acceptance by both parties of the General Assembly’s recommendation.
Sir Lauterpacht, a renowned expert on international law and editor of Oppenheim’s International Law, clarified that, from a legal standpoint, the 1947 UN Partition Resolution had no legislative character to vest territorial rights in either Jews or Arabs. In a monograph relating to one of the most complex aspects of the territorial issue, the status of Jerusalem,7 Lauterpacht wrote that to be a binding force, the “Partition Plan” would have had to arise from the principle pacta sunt servanda,8 that is, from agreement of the parties at variance to the proposed plan. In the case of Israel, Lauterpacht explains:
“… the coming into existence of Israel does not depend legally upon the Resolution. The right of a State to exist flows from its factual existence – especially when that existence is prolonged, shows every sign of continuance and is recognised by the generality of nations.”
Reviewing Lauterpacht’s arguments, Professor Stone added that Israel’s “legitimacy” or the “legal foundation” for its birth does not reside with the United Nations’ “Partition Plan,” which as a consequence of Arab actions became a dead issue. Professor Stone concluded:
“… The State of Israel is thus not legally derived from the partition plan, but rests (as do most other states in the world) on assertion of independence by its people and government, on the vindication of that independence by arms against assault by other states, and on the establishment of orderly government within territory under its stable control.”9
Such attempts by Palestinians (and now by the ICJ) to ‘roll back the clock’ and resuscitate Resolution 181 almost six decades after its rejection as if nothing had happened, are totally inadmissible. Both Palestinians and their Arab brethren in neighboring countries rendered the plan null and void by their own subsequent aggressive actions.
Arabs absolute rejectionism of UN Resolution 181.
Following passage of Resolution 181 by the General Assembly, Arab countries took the dais to reiterate their absolute rejection of the recommendation and intention to render implementation of Resolution 181 a moot question by the use of force. These examples from the transcript of the General Assembly plenary meeting on November 29 1947 speak for themselves:
“Mr. JAMALI (Iraq): … We believe that the decision which we have now taken … undermines peace, justice and democracy. In the name of my Government, I wish to state that it feels that this decision is antidemocratic, illegal, impractical and contrary to the Charter. … Therefore, in the name of my Government, I wish to put on record that Iraq does not recognize the validity of this decision, will reserve freedom of action towards its implementation, and holds those who were influential in passing it against the free conscience of mankind responsible for the consequences.”
“Amir. ARSLAN (Syria): … Gentlemen, the Charter is dead. But it did not die a natural death; it was murdered, and you all know who is guilty. My country will never recognize such a decision [Partition]. It will never agree to be responsible for it. Let the consequences be on the heads of others, not on ours.”
“H. R. H. Prince Seif El ISLAM ABDULLAH (Yemen): The Yemen delegation has stated previously that the partition plan is contrary to justice and to the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, the Government of Yemen does not consider itself bound by such a decision … and will reserve its freedom of action towards the implementation of this decision.”10
The “Partition Plan” was met not only by verbal rejection on the Arab side but also by concrete, bellicose steps to block its implementation and destroy the Jewish polity by force of arms, a goal affirmed publicly by the Arabs even before Resolution 181 was brought to a vote.
The ICJ simply ignores the unpleasant fact that the Arabs not only rejected the compromise and took action to prevent establishment of a Jewish state, but also blocked establishment of an Arab state under the “Partition Plan” not only before the 1948 Israel War of Independence, but also after the war when they themselves controlled the West Bank _(1948-1967), rendering the recommendation a still birth.
Professor Stone wrote about this novelty of resurrection in 1981 when he analyzed a similar attempt by pro-Palestinians at the UN to rewrite the history of the conflict (published as ‘Studies’). Stone called it “revival of the dead”:
“To attempt to show, as these studies do, that Resolution 181(II) ‘remains’ in force in 1981 is thus an undertaking even more miraculous than would be the revival of the dead. It is an attempt to give life to an entity that the Arab states had themselves aborted before it came to maturity and birth. To propose that Resolution 181(II) can be treated as if it has binding force in 1981, [E.H., the year Professor Stone’s book was published] for the benefit of the same Arab states, who by their aggression destroyed it ab initio,11 also violates ‘general principles of law,’ such as those requiring claimants to equity to come ‘with clean hands,’ and forbidding a party who has unlawfully repudiated a transaction from holding the other party to terms that suit the later expediencies of the repudiating party”12 [italics by author].
In its narrative of events, the International Court of Justice’s opinion does not even mention the fact that Jordan (at the time, Trans-Jordan) crossed the international border (the Jordan River) and illegally occupied part of Mandate Palestine, annexing and labeling it the ‘West Bank’ to make it sound like a natural part of the ‘East Bank’ (Trans-Jordan). Indeed, it was Jordan that controlled the West Bank territory for 19 years between 1948 and 1967.13
The ICJ describes these scores of events in seven words: “The Plan of Partition was not implemented.”14
The ICJ fails to read the fine print in the Resolutions it cites. The ICJ embraces the General Assembly’s generous annexation of Jerusalem (discussed later in this critique) as part of ‘Occupied Palestinian Territory’ – constantly referring to “the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem.” In the same breath, the ICJ cites Resolution 181 that leaves the status of Jerusalem in abeyance, in Part III (D) calling for a temporary ‘special regime’ for the City of Jerusalem:
“… It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City” [italics by author].
Again, this never took place because the “Partition Plan” became a dead issue. If it is not a dead issue, then logically, after almost 59 years it is time to call for a referendum (as stated in Resolution 181, see above) of all Jerusalemites, Jews and Arabs, to decide the status of the city that has always had a Jewish majority as far back as 1870.
Even the UN recognized that Resolution 181 was a moot issue. Had the ICJ examined UN records, it would have had to address a July 30 1949, working paper of the UN Secretariat, entitled The Future of Arab Palestine and the Question of Partition, which noted that:
“The Arabs rejected the United Nations Partition Plan so that any comment of theirs did not specifically concern the status of the Arab section of Palestine under partition but rather rejected the scheme in its entirety.
“… On 18 September the Progress Report of the Mediator was submitted to the General Assembly. In evaluating the situation of the proposed Arab State, the Mediator stated: ‘As regards the parts of Palestine under Arab control, no central authority exists and no independent Arab State has been organized or attempted. This situation may be explained in part by Arab unwillingness to undertake any step which would suggest even tacit acceptance of partition, and by their insistence on a unitary State in Palestine. The Partition Plan presumed that effective organs of state government could be more or less immediately set up in the Arab part of Palestine. This does not seem possible today in view of the lack of organized authority springing from Arab Palestine itself, and the administrative disintegration following the termination of the Mandate.’”15
The Secretariat considered Resolution 181 a dead issue, noting:
“… an Arab State for which the Partition Plan provided has not _materialized …”16
In the eyes of the International Court of Justice, even the 1948 Israel War of Independence – before the occupation and clearly an Arab war of aggression – gets the same treatment as the 1967 Six-Day War. The ICJ’s rendition of events exonerates the Arabs of any complicity, skipping merrily over uncomfortable facts in the process:
“The Arab population of Palestine and the Arab States rejected the [Partition] plan, contending that it was unbalanced; on 14 May 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence on the strength of the General Assembly resolution; armed conflict then broke out between Israel and a number of Arab States and the Plan of Partition was not implemented”17 [italics by author].
Far more significantly, from 1922 forward and through nearly three decades of British Mandatory rule, the Arabs systematically rejected every plan for co-existence that included any form of Jewish political empowerment whatsoever. These plans included British attempts to create a joint legislature, insuring the Arabs would have had an overwhelming majority and that would have enabled them to cut off any further Jewish immigration.These same Arabs even refused to establish an Arab Agency for development of the Arab sector, which would parallel the Jewish Agency.18
In the fall of 1947, the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestinian Question19 tried, to no avail, to ‘bring the Arabs around.’ Had the ICJ read the minutes of this damning UN document, they would find this rejectionism clearly established. The Special Rapporteur, Thor Thors of Iceland, wrote to the Security Council days before the historic vote on November 25 1947. He cited how the Arab Higher Committee first:
“… rejected the recommendations of the Special Committee on Palestine and advocated the establishment on democratic lines, in the whole of Palestine, of an Arab State which would protect the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities.”20
“… did not accept an invitation to sit with the members of Sub-Committee 1 when the latter discussed the question of boundaries. The Arab Higher Committee was prepared to assist and furnish information only with regard to the question of the termination of the Mandate and the creation of a unitary State.”21
Suffice it to say, the use of the terms “rejection” and “contending” in the ICJ’s ‘historical narrative’ hardly befit 1948 realities. “Rejection” was expressed in nearly six months of guerrilla warfare by local Arabs (today’s Palestinians) against the Jews of Palestine (today’s Israelis), targeting primarily civilians. In the midst of this period (January 29 1948), the First Monthly Progress Report of the UN-appointed Palestine Commission was submitted to the Security Council. How does the UN describe what actually transpired? Actualization of Resolution 181 was placed in the hands of a “commission … with direct responsibility for implementing the measures recommended by the General Assembly.”22
Implementation of Resolution 181’s recommendations hinged not only on the five Member States appointed to represent the UN (Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, Philippines) and Great Britain, but first and foremost on the participation of the two sides who were invited to appoint representatives. The Commission then reported:
“… The invitation extended by the  resolution was promptly accepted by the Government of the United Kingdom and by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, both of which designated representatives to assist the commission. … As regards [to] the Arab Higher Committee, the following telegraphic response was received by the Secretary-General on 19 January:
ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE IS DETERMINED PRESIST [PERSIST] IN REJECTION PARTITION AND IN REFUSAL RECOGNIZE UN[O] RESOLUTION THIS RESPECT AND ANYTHING DERIVING THEREFROM [THERE FROM]. FOR THESE REASONS IT IS UNABLE [TO] ACCEPT [THE] INVITATION.”23
ICJ – “Armed conflict then broke out.”
The “armed conflict [that] then broke out,”24 in the words of the International Court of Justice, was Israel’s 1948 War of Independence. It was actually the second stage of the Arab war of aggression, launched the day after Israel’s acceptance of Resolution 181 on November 29 1947. It was a pre-planned and coordinated invasion by the armed forces of Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and contingents from Saudi Arabia and Yemen forces across the international borders of Mandate Palestine, boasting they would “throw the Jews into the sea.”
On May 18 1948 in response to an urgent cablegram to the Iraqi delegate to the UN, the reply affirmed that there were Iraqi troops in Palestine in areas where Jews are the majority, declaring that:
“… Elements of our armed forces entered Palestine without discrimination either to the character of areas or to the creed of the inhabitants [invaded Jewish areas] … Units of Iraqi forces are now operating west of the Jordan. … Their military objectives … are the suppression of lawless Zionist terrorism which was dangerously spreading all over the country, and restoration of peace and order. Such objectives will result in enabling the people of Palestine to set up a ‘united state’ in which both Arabs and Jews will enjoy equal Democratic rights. … Upon the termination of the Mandate on the 15th May, 1948, no legal authority was constituted to take its place. In the same time the terrorism and the aggression of a minority assumed vast proportions and resulted in atrocities and massacre leading up to a complete state of anarchy. … The Arab League, as a regional organization interested in keeping the peace in that region could not stand by without action. … Concerning what is called areas (towns, cities, districts) of Palestine where Jews are in the majority, it must again be stated that the division of the country into such units for the present purpose is misleading and can be entertained on the basis of partition which we reject.”25
On May 22 1948, in response to a similar cablegram to the Lebanese foreign minister from the Security Council inquiring whether Lebanon had invaded, the foreign minister wrote the Security Council:
“[Lebanese forces] are operating in northern Palestine. Their military objectives are to help pacify Palestine in cooperation with the forces of other States of the Arab League, as stated in the memorandum of the _Secretary-General of the Arab League on May 1 (document S/745). … The League of Arab States is responsible for the exercise of political functions in any and all parts of Palestine. … The League of Arab States is not now negotiating with the Jews on a political settlement in Palestine and will not enter into such negotiations so long as the Jews persist in their intention and their efforts to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.”26
A similar query to the foreign minister of Trans-Jordan was ignored. The following questions were not answered:
“Are armed element of your armed forces or irregular forces sponsored by your government now operating (1) in Palestine (2) in areas (towns, cities, districts) of Palestine where the Jews are in the majority?”27
Instead the Trans-Jordanian foreign minister complained in a short cablegram that:
“the government of the United States of America [who had penned the questions for the Security Council] has not yet recognized the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan … yet [it] recognized the so-called Jewish government within a few hours.”
The Arabs rejected repeated calls by the Security Council for a cease-fire and only agreed to a four-week truce after being warned by the Security Council on May 29 1948:
“… if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter.”28
The documents cited above are only a few examples of the evidence available to the ICJ, all of which appear to have been ignored.
Israel overcomes Arab aggression at a terrible cost.
The first cease-fire in the 18-month war finally took effect on June 11 1948.
While Israel prevailed, one percent of the pre-war Jewish population (6,000 persons) was killed. In American terms, that is equivalent to 2.8 million American civilians and soldiers being killed over an 18-month period.29 The facts that there was a clear aggressor and a clear target in the “armed conflict” in 1948 appears in a host of UN documents that are as immaterial in the International Court of Justice’s eyes as the fate of over a thousand Israelis, again, mostly civilians, deliberately murdered in cold blood by Palestinian suicide bombers and other Palestinian terrorists since 2000.
What became of Resolution 181? On May 17 1948 – after the invasion began – the Palestine Commission designed to implement Resolution 181 adjourned sine die [indefinitely], after the General Assembly:
“appointed a United Nations Mediator in Palestine, which relieves the United Nations Palestine Commission from the further exercise of its responsibilities.”
At the time, some thought the “Partition Plan” could be revived, but by the end of the war, Resolution 181 had become a moot issue as realities on the ground made establishment of an armistice-line (the Green Line), a temporary ceasefire line expected to be followed by peace treaties, the most constructive path to solving the conflict.
The Palestinians, for their part, continued to reject Resolution 181, viewing the Jewish state as “occupied territory,” a label that exists to this day in PLO and Palestinian Authority maps, insignia and even statistical data. Rejection of any form of Jewish polity anywhere in western Palestine was underscored in the PLO’s 1964 Charter.
The Arab Palestinians and the “clean hand” principle.
Only a few years ago voices emerged in Arab circles suggesting that the “Partition Plan” be the basis of a “just and lasting peace,” rather than demanding a return to the Green Line. The ICJ is the first highly regarded institution to fall for the bait, claiming that Palestinian rights to self-determination emanate from the very document repudiated by the Arabs for almost sixty years. In 1976, for example, the Arab League was still berating the Family of Nations at the UN that: “In its resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947, the General Assembly imposed the partition on Palestine against the expressed wishes of the majority of its population.”30
The International Court of Justice, by accepting testimony from the Palestinians as interested parties and declaring that it is the ICJ’s solemn responsibility to stand up for Palestinian rights, performed another flip-flop by declaring that in such instances (i.e., the “clean hands” test) the Palestinians are exempt.
In paragraphs 63 and 64 of the opinion, the ICJ says:
“Israel has contended that Palestine, given its responsibility for acts of violence against Israel and its population which the wall is aimed at addressing, cannot seek from the Court a remedy for a situation resulting from its own wrongdoing. In this context, Israel has invoked the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de sua injuria propria, which it considers to be as relevant in advisory proceedings as it is in contentious cases. Therefore, Israel concludes, good faith and the principle of ‘clean hands’ provide a compelling reason that should lead the Court to refuse the General Assembly’s request. The Court does not consider this argument [the ‘clean hands’ argument raised by Israel] to be pertinent. As was emphasized earlier, it was the General Assembly which requested the advisory opinion, and the opinion is to be given to the General Assembly, and not to a specific State or entity.”
Professor Stone explains the “clean hands” concept:
“… there are also certain other legal grounds, rooted in basic notions of justice and equity, on which the Arab states (and the Palestinians whom they represented in these matters) should not, in any case, be permitted, after so lawless a resort to violence against the plan, to turn around decades later, and claim legal entitlements under it.
“More than one of ‘the general principles of law’ acknowledged in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice seem to forbid it. Such claimants do not come with ‘clean hands’ to seek equity; their hands indeed are mired by their lawlessly violent bid to destroy the very resolution  and plan from which they now seek equity. They may also be thought by their representations concerning these documents, to have led others to act to their own detriment, and thus to be debarred by their own conduct from espousing, in pursuit of present expediencies, positions they formerly so strongly denounced. They may also be thought to be in breach of the general principle of good faith in two other respects.
“Their position resembles that of a party to a transaction who has unlawfully repudiated the transaction, and comes to court years later claiming that selected provisions of it should be meticulously enforced against the wronged party. It also resembles that of a party who has by unlawful violence wilfully destroyed the subject-matter that is ‘the fundamental basis’ on which consent rested, and now clamors to have the original terms enforced against the other party. These are grounds that reinforce the pithy view of U.S. Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell that the 1947 partition was never effectuated.
“… the Partition Resolution and Plan, since they were prevented by Arab rejection and armed aggression from entering into legal operation, could not thereafter carry any legal effects binding on Israel.”31
When armistice lines were finally drawn in the spring and summer of 1949 under the auspices of the UN, they reflected ‘facts on the ground.’ Resolution 181 had been tossed into the waste bin of history, along with all other plans of partition.
- UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine. November 29 1947. See at: http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-resolutions/10063.htm. (10063) ↑
- “Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations [to partition] ,” UN Resolution 181, A, (d) [italics by author]. ↑
- United Nations Palestine Commission, First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council. A/AC.21/7, 29 January 1948. See: http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-resolutions/10923.htm. (10923) ↑
- Security Council Resolution S/RES/ 54 (1948) at http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-resolutions/10894.htm. (10894) ↑
- Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48. 1949.I.13. December 31 1948. See at: http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-documents/11270.htm. (11270) ↑
- Ibid. ↑
- Professor, Judge Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places, Pamphlet No. 19 (London, Anglo-Israel Association, 1968). ↑
- “Treaties must be honored,” the first principle of international law. ↑
- Professor Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine, Assault on the Law of Nations, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 127. ↑
- UN GA “Continuation of the discussion on the Palestinian question.” Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting. A/PV.128, November 29 1947. (11363) ↑
- In Latin: From the beginning. ↑
- Professor Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine, Assault on the Law of Nations, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 128. ↑
- “The 1948 Arab-Israeli War – Prior to the UN General Assembly’s November 1947 decision to partition Palestine, King Abdullah had proposed sending the Arab Legion to defend the Arabs of Palestine. Reacting to the passing of the partition plan, he announced Jordan’s readiness to deploy the full force of the Arab Legion in Palestine. An Arab League meeting held in Amman two days before the expiration of the British mandate concluded that Arab countries would send troops to Palestine to join forces with Jordan’s army. … [Jordan] Parliament unanimously approved a motion to unite the two banks of the Jordan River, constitutionally expanding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in order to safeguard what was left of the Arab territory of Palestine from further Zionist expansion.” See the official Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan website at: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_palestine.html. (10634) ↑
- See Appendix I. ICJ Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paragraph 71. ↑
- United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine: The Future of Arab Palestine and the Question of Partition. A/AC.25/W.19, July 30 1949. See: http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-documents/11070.htm. (11070) ↑
- Ibid. ↑
- See Appendix I. ICJ Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paragraph 71. ↑
- Christopher Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel – Palestine from Balfour to Bevin, Collins London 1965, p. 81. ↑
- General Assembly, A/516, November 25 1947, at http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-documents/11290.htm. (11290) ↑
- Ibid. ↑
- In lieu of the two independent States, the city of Jerusalem under an international regime, and the economic union proposed. ↑
- United Nations Palestine Commission. First Monthly Progress Report To The Security Council. A/AC.21/7. 29 January 1948. See at: http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-resolutions/10923.htm. (10923) ↑
- Ibid. ↑
- See Appendix I. ICJ Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paragraph 71. ↑
- United Nations Security Council Document S/769 May 22 1948. See: http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/65eb4dccbb362b5585256e4c006f6a02!OpenDocument. (11365) ↑
- United Nations Security Council Document S/770, May 22 1948, at: http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/98be7a17e488f06985256db200676705!OpenDocument. (11364) ↑
- Security Council Document S/760, May 20 2003 (the date is incorrect in the original), http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/aa99ba96c0a95d5985256db2006928bd!OpenDocument. (11366) ↑
- Security Council Document S/801, May 29 1948, at: http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/34235b8f785c7b4485256e76006e58da!OpenDocument. (11367) ↑
- Between November 30 1947 – July 20 1949. ↑
- At a meeting of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinians People, General Assembly Document A/AC.183/L.22, April 26 1976, at: http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/842f480902f25fef85256e2f006a82d2?OpenDocument. (11374) ↑
- Professor Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine, Assault on the Law of Nations, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 65. ↑