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Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel addressed the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 29, 2014

Benjamin Netanyahu UN General Assembly
Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the UN General Assembly on Sept. 29, 2014
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Is Security Council Resolution 1701 Good for Israel

  Eli E. Hertz

 

 

 

 

"War is not politics by other means", but "represents a
catastrophic failure of political skill and imagination."

Kofi Annan, Secretary-General1
August 11, 2006

 


From a Good Draft to a Bad Resolution

August 5 - August 11, 2006
This document outlines the debates, drafts, and the final adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 regarding Israel's second Lebanon War during the summer of 2006. Readers of this document are given sufficient background material and references to study the resolution and draw their own conclusion: Is Resolution 1701 good for Israel?

Resolution 1701 was adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VI, and thus, under international law it lacks legal authority or enforcement power. The recommendations delineated in the resolution cannot be imposed on the parties concerned. Any recommendation, rule, or law that lacks enforcement power, is practically insignificant.2

To comprehend how Israel missed the opportunity to solidify the conditions spelled out in Resolution 1701 with authentic enforcement power under Chapter VII, one need only read how Hesham Youssef, chief of the cabinet of the Arab League secretary-general evaluates the situation:

“The resolution in its final draft is, as most Arab diplomats admit, much better than in its original draft or even midway draft. It was a 90 or 80 per cent bad resolution and we managed to make it a 70 or 60 per cent bad resolution … the resolution is issued under Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII of the UN Charter - where the latter allows for the use of force to ensure implementation - is a diplomatic achievement.”3

In other words, the Arab League “welcomes” the weakness of the resolution which lacks enforcement power to “ensure implementation” of resolution 1701.

Central features in Draft Resolution of August 5, 2006:4

  1. The Draft does not call for the immediate release of the abducted Israeli soldiers;
  2. The Draft does not require an immediate withdrawal of IDF troops from Southern Lebanon ;
  3. The Draft provides for the "elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government" [Italic the author]
  4. The Draft calls for an international embargo “on the sale or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government” [Italic by author]

Central features (or lack of) in Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006:

  1. The United States abandoned its demand that Israeli troops be allowed to remain in southern Lebanon until a strong international force is in place with a tough mandate. Instead the resolution calls for a parallel move: Israeli withdrawal while the Lebanese army and the international forces takes over the territory between the Israeli forces, the Lebanese army and the international force.
  2. The resolution (as opposed to the draft) reads: “no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government.” It is unlikely that the Lebanese government will invite any foreign forces, including UNIFIL, to fight segments (such as Hizbollah) of its own citizenry.
  3. Resolution 1701 never mentions the word embargo and does not set-forth an enforcement mechanism or enforcement power, as Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni claims:

    “Even in the last hours before passage of the resolution, we wanted to ensure that this embargo would be enforceable and substantive, preventing the transfer of arms from these countries to Hizbollah, in fact, to anyone other than the Lebanese army. Now the embargo is part of the UN resolution and the terms and formulation of this article are acceptable to Israel and express our opinion - a proper embargo.”5

  4. No attention has been given to the likelihood of Lebanon being ruled by a ‘democratic' elected government led by Hizbollah – Rendering Resolution 1701 obsolete.
  5. UNIFIL is not authorized to use armed force or to impose in any forceful manner the implementation of the recommendations spelled-out in UN Resolution 1701. Major-General Alain Pelligrini ( France ) the former force Commander made it clear:

    “The disarmament of Hizbollah is not the business of UNIFIL. This is a strictly Lebanese affair, which should be resolved at a national level.”6

    The UNIFIL force includes recruits from countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel , countries that support terrorism and destruction of the Jewish state, and countries that are in an official state of war with Israel.
  6. Although the government of Israel was calling to “add [robust] international forces to the Lebanese army in order to strengthen it,” it neglected to call for a minimum force of 15,000 troops, rather than any number between 2,000 to 15,000 as the resolution recommends. Therefore Resolution 1701 does not guarantees, now or in the future, the present of any number of troops above 2,000.
  7. Resolution 1701 calls on the international community to “take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people.” With the U.S. leading this effort, “Lebanon's friends have pledged a total of $7.6 billion at the International Conference on Support for Lebanon.”
    There is no mention of Israel's humanitarian and financial needs, estimated at nearly 5 billion dollars - all due to Hizbollah’s aggression with Lebanon as its accomplice.7

 


UN Security Council Resolution 1701 - Timeline

Significant Points of time in the Evolution of Resolution 1701

Saturday, August 5, 2006

American and French efforts to get agreement on a resolution ending the conflict continued throughout the weekend after the two nations presented the draft to all 15 Security Council members. 

Arab foreign ministers meet in Cairo at the headquarters of the Arab League to assess the language of the UN Security Council draft resolution, which they disliked.

A draft resolution is being circulated among United Nations members.

Sunday, August 6, 2006

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says a quick vote on the UN draft resolution aimed at ending the conflict is important, but warns it is only the first step towards lasting peace. Lebanon formally asks the Security Council to revise the resolution.

Monday, August 7, 2006

Arab ministers to back Lebanese demands for changes to a proposed UN resolution on the crisis.

US President George W. Bush says he wants the resolution passed as soon as possible.

Tuesday, August 8, 2006

A delegation from the Arab League travels to UN headquarters in New York to push Lebanon 's demand for an immediate Israeli withdrawal.

The U.N. Security Council was asked by the Arab League to modify the draft resolution and to call for: immediate cease-fire, release the Lebanese and Israeli prisoners and detainees, withdrawal of the Israeli army behind the internationally recognized border with Israel, placing the Shebaa Farms area and the Kfarshouba Hills under UN jurisdiction, and for Israel to deliver the land mine maps in south Lebanon to the UN.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert calls Beirut 's plan to send 15,000 troops to the south if Israel withdraws an "interesting step" which Israel will examine. (Listing to Livni, one would assume that this move was an Israeli government goal from the outset: “ we must to see the Lebanese army moving southward on an immediate and practical level”).

Wednesday, August 9, 2006

Israel's Security Cabinet approved a wider ground operation in south Lebanon. It left it to Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister Peretz to decide when or whether to order the army to carry out the plan.

Two Israel Defense Forces General Staff officers, operations chief Major General Gadi Eisenkut and the Intelligence Division's head of research, Brigadier General Yossi Beiditz, strongly opposed the decision to launch a broad ground offensive against Hizbollah shortly before the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire in the war in Lebanon .… Olmert's military secretary, Major General Gad Shmani, also opposed the move, and advised the prime minister accordingly.8

Thursday, August 10, 2006

Lebanon objects to a U.S.–French draft resolution because it does not call for an immediate cease-fire and the "new" UNIFIL force would have a broad mandate to use military force.9

Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora tells Secretary General Kofi Annan he is not sure whether he could influence Hizbollah to accept the draft resolution as it reads.

John R. Bolton, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations following a meeting with his French counterpart, Jean-Marc de La Sabliere: "We've closed some of the areas of disagreement with the French."

The United States abandons its demand that Israeli troops be allowed to remain in southern Lebanon until a strong international force is in place with a tough mandate. Instead the draft calls for a "parallel" move: Israeli withdrawal while the Lebanese army and the international forces, takes over the territory between the Israeli forces, the Lebanese army and the international force.

The U.S. also agreed to do away with a provision explicitly authorizing the disarming of Hizbollah.

The decision for a large-scale operation in Lebanon based on Israel 's Security Cabinet decision was delayed the second time by 24 hours.

Friday, August 11, 2006 - major expansion of a ground operation

N.Y. – A new draft resolution is being reviewed by the members of the Security Council. This draft with minor changes was voted later as Resolution 1701.

Israel - Olmert is apprised of the latest UN draft resolution language. After reading the text he concluded that this is a bad resolution for Israel and described his reaction “(stunned)”10

Israel 's daily Yediot reports:

“The Defense Minister Peretz believed that a massive IDF movement may influence the outcome of the Security Council, and will improve the likelihood for a diplomatic breakthrough.”

At about 4:50 p.m. Israel time – 9:50 a.m. New York time, Prime Minister Olmert approves a major expansion of IDF ground forces into Lebanon .

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701, at a meeting that began at 7:04 p.m. and ended at 9:15 p.m. Eastern time.

In a briefing by Foreign Minister Livni following Israel 's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, she notes:11

“On Friday we had, in effect, reached the conclusion that this package would not change the situation in Lebanon and we were not prepared to settle for statements that were simply words with no effectiveness.

“At the same time, during the afternoon, as you know, a decision was reached by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense to approve the start of a military operation and just as it was starting to go into action late Friday we began to strengthen the resolution and return it to the level at which we felt it should originally be.”


It appears that Prime Minster Olmert, Foreign Minister Livni, and Defense Minister Peretz, all failed to explain the scope of the "improvement" attained as a direct result of IDF expansion into Lebanon on August 11, 2006 .

The question arise: Was achieving any last minute ‘non binding benefits', worth the lives of 33 Israeli soldiers?

The author of this study personally questioned a senior U.S. diplomat if there was any significant language change made to the pending resolution as a result of Israeli "pressure" via "the last minute" Israeli incursion? The reply was quick and sharp: “nonsense.”

Saturday – Sunday, August 12-13, 2006

33 IDF soldiers are killed in ground operations and nearly 200 are injured.12



Appendix A

The UN Charter - Rules Matter

The Differences between Chapters VI13 and VII14 of the UN Charter:

UN Resolution 1701 adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VI intends to be followed and implemented via negotiated settlements between the concerned parties: In this case Lebanon and Israel .

Under international law, Resolutions 1701 is at best a declarative statement of sentiment that lacks legal authority or enforcement power whatsoever . The recommendations spelled-out in the resolution can not be imposed on the parties concerned. In fact, the title of Chapter VI also offers a clue to its nature, for it deals with “Pacific Resolution of Disputes.”

In contrast, resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII invest the Security Council with power to issue stringent resolutions that require nations to comply with the terms set forth in the resolution. This leaves no room to negotiate a settlement with the affected parties [E.H., when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII adopted Resolution 678 that only required the aggressor , Iraq , to comply. Security Resolution 1373 adopted in 2001 under Chapter VII, among others, directs states to exercise their “duty” to “suppress” terrorist acts].

If Resolution 1701 would have been adopted under Chapter VII it would leave no room for speculation as to its nature by using the language: “ Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations” or a more descriptive language: “ Acting under Article [Number] of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.” This customary use of language is absent from Resolution 1701.

Any recommendation, rule, or law that lack enforcement power, is practically insignificant.

Minister Livni statement “so we got [Chapter] 7 minus”15 are completely injudicious and fundamentally wrong. There is no room in international law for a loose interpretation of the Charter, and “7 minus” is not a recognized provision in international law.

It is rather strange that Minister Livni, of all bodies, takes the liberty to ‘change' what Chapter VI and VII clearly state. UN Charters were carefully penned and should be strictly read in a direct manner ‘as is'.

“The Court [E.H., International Court of Justice] considered that if Article … had been intended to create an obligation … such intention would have been expressed in a direct manner. 16

Writing on the subject of the legal effect of Resolutions and Codes of Conduct of the United Nations, Professor, Judge Schwebel, the former president of the International Court of Justice noted:

“what the terms and the travaux (notes for the official record) of the Charter do not support, can scarcely be implemented.”17



Appendix B

UN Draft Resolution, Saturday August 5, 2006

Note the type statements:
Preparatory Paragraph ( PP ). Operative Paragraph ( OP ).

Security Council,

PP1 . Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) and 1680 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17) of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

PP2 . Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

PP3 . Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

PP4 : Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel ,

OP1 . Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

OP2 . Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

OP3 . Also reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949 ;

OP4 . Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours for verifiably and purely civilian purposes, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

OP5 . Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty and authority;

Appendix B

OP6 . Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- strict respect by all parties for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel and Lebanon ;

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

- delineation of the international borders of Lebanon , especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shebaa farms area;

- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Lebanese armed and security forces and of UN mandated international forces deployed in this area;

- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;

- deployment of an international force in Lebanon , consistent with paragraph 10 below;

- establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government ;

- elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;

- provision to the United Nations of remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel 's possession;

OP7 . Invites the Secretary General to support efforts to secure agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above;

OP8 . Requests the Secretary General to develop, in liaison with key international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms, and to present those proposals to the Security Council within thirty days;

OP9 . Calls on all parties to cooperate during this period with the Security Council and to refrain from any action contrary to paragraph 1 above that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, or the safe return of displaced persons, and requests the Secretary General to keep the Council informed in this regard;

OP10 . Expresses its intention, upon confirmation to the Security Council that the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel have agreed in principle to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above, and subject to their approval, to authorize in a further resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter the deployment of a UN mandated international force to support the Lebanese armed forces and government in providing a secure environment and contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

OP11 . Requests UNIFIL, upon cessation of hostilities, to monitor its implementation and to extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons;

OP12 . Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to ensure arms or related materiel are not imported into Lebanon without its consent and requests UNIFIL, conditions permitting, to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

OP13 . Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and to provide any relevant information in light of the Council's intention to adopt, consistent with paragraph 10 above, a further resolution;

OP14 . Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Appendix C

UN Security Council Resolution 1701

August 11, 2006

Note the type statements:
Preparatory Paragraph ( PP ). Operative Paragraph ( OP ).

The Security Council,

PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its president on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June, 2000, of 19 October, 2004, of 4 May 2005, of 23 January 2006 and of 30 July 2006;

PP2. Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons;

PP3. Emphasising the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasising the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers;

PP4. Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel ;

PP5. Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese prime minister and the commitment of the government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a UN force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon;

PP6. Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest;

PP7. Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area;

PP8. Welcoming the unanimous decision by the government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in south Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from UNIFIL as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties;

PP9. Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict;

PP10. Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

OP1. 1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

OP2. 2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorised by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

OP3. 3. Emphasises the importance of the extension of the control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon;

OP4. 4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

OP5. 5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949 ;

OP6. 6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

The resolution shuns the call to the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Israeli people, as it does for the Lebanese people. Estimates of the damaged caused to Israel by the war is as high as 4.5 billion U.S. dollars.

OP7. 7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

OP8. 8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorised in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;

- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;

- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its government;

- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel 's possession;

OP9. 9. Invites the secretary general to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the government of Lebanon and the government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and expresses its intention to be actively involved;

OP10. 10. Requests the secretary general to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within 30 days;

OP11. 11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

(a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;

(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;

(c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the government of Lebanon and the government of Israel ;

(d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;

(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;

(f) Assist the government of Lebanon , at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

OP12. 12. Acting in support of a request from the government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilised for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

OP13. 13. Requests the secretary general urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, urges member states to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and expresses its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

OP14. 14. Calls upon the government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and requests UNIFIL as authorised in paragraph 11 to assist the government of Lebanon at its request;

OP15. 15. Decides further that all states shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft;

(a) the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories, and;

(b) the provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above, except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorised by the government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorised in paragraph 11;

OP16. 16. Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007 , and expresses its intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

OP17. 17. Requests the secretary general to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

OP18. 18. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

OP19. 19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Appendix D

UNIFIL Mandate

In accordance to Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 , UNIFIL was established to:18

“- Confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon ;

- Restore international peace and security;

“- Assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.”

And in accordance to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006 , UNIFIL, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426, shall:

“- Monitor the cessation of hostilities;

“- Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon;

“- Coordinate its activities referred to in the preceding paragraph (above) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;

“- Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;

“- Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area;

“- Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel.

“By this resolution, the Council also authorized UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind; to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council; and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”


UNIFIL Force of 12,429 (as of 16 February 2007 ) includes countries with no diplomatic relations with Israel . Countries that support terrorism and destruction of the Jewish state, and countries that are in an official state of war with Israel .

Belgium, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey.

 


Links:
UN Charter
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/un-documents/10061.htm.
Lebanon UNIFIL
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11906.htm.
Setback for U.N. Draft Resolution On Lebanon
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11795.htm.
Briefing by FM Livni following Israel's acceptance of UN Resolution 1701
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11794.htm.
Israel-Hizbollah conflict: Victims of rocket attacks and IDF casualties
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11918.htm.
General Staff officers: Last-minute expansion of war is a mistake
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11784.htm.
Security council calls for end to hostilities between Hizbollah, Israel, UN Department of Public Information
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11797.htm.
The U.S.-French Draft Resolution on Lebanon: Strengths and Weaknesses
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11834.htm.
Wall Street Journal: Israel Is Losing This War
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11844.htm.
Arab League takes Lebanon concerns to U.N. council
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11916.htm.
Al-Ahram, Old alliance intact
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11917.htm.


1 Kofi Annan might have summed it all when he diplomatically reflected on Israel last expansion into Lebanon on August 11 2006 .
2 See: Appendix A .
3 The Arab League and Lebanon. See:
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11917.htm
4 See Appendix B.
5 Briefing by FM Livni following Israel's acceptance of UN Resolution 1701, 13 Aug 2006. See:
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11794.htm
.
6 “U.N. commander says his troops will not disarm Hizbollah” International Herald Tribune, September 18 2006. See at:
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/18/africa/ME_GEN_Mideast_Peacekeepers.php.
7 President's Bush's Statement on the Situation in Lebanon See:
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11914.htm
8 “General Staff officers warned PM: Last-minute expansion of war is a mistake” Ze'ev Schiff, September 7 2007, Haaretz. See:
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11784.htm
.
9 See CNN “Arab League takes Lebanon concerns to U.N. council” at:
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11916.htm
.
10 Yediot daily, [In Hebrew] September 22 2006
11 Olmert and Livni claimed that the last minute expansion into Lebanon on August 11, influenced the outcome of the Security Council, resulting in an improved Security Council resolution. He also claim to poses an intelligent report backing this claim. This incursion claimed the life of 33 Israeli soldiers.
12 See Israel-Hizbollah conflict: Victims of rocket attacks and IDF casualties at:
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11918.htm
13 See: UN Charter VI:
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter6.htm
.
14 See: UN Charter VII:
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm
.
15 Briefing by FM Livni following Israel's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. 13 August 2006. See:
http://www.mefacts.com/cache/html/lebanon/11794.htm. (11794)
16 See International status of South-West Africa. Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950 at:
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/isswasummary500711.htm
. (10954)
17 Professor, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, The Legal Effect of Resolutions and Codes of Conduct of the United Nations in Justice in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Opinions quoted in this critiques are not derived from his position as a judge of the ICJ. See:
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icvjudge/Schwebel.html
. (11013)
18 UNIFIL Mandate, see:
http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unifil/mandate.html
.

 

 


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